Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine entered its fifth year on February 24, with no end in sight despite Russia’s overwhelming material advantage.
Most experts initially predicted Ukraine’s defeat within days. Russia’s population is more than three times larger, its GDP roughly ten times bigger, and its military, along with its arsenal of tanks, artillery, missiles, and warplanes, is far more extensive. Russian leaders, including Putin, expected Ukrainians to surrender, perhaps even welcome their troops. While US and British intelligence foresaw the invasion, they also anticipated a swift Russian victory.
Ukraine’s strong morale is a key reason it has defied those early predictions. Its military has suffered between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, including 100,000 to 140,000 fatalities, yet retains the will to fight. Russia has reportedly suffered even heavier losses—around 1.2 million casualties, with 219,000 confirmed deaths through records, and some estimates putting the total as high as 325,000. Geolocated data shows roughly 24,000 pieces of Russian equipment have been destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured. No one expected such staggering losses, least of all Putin.
Ukrainian civilians have also endured terrible hardships. During the winter of 2022–23, Russia repeatedly attacked Ukraine’s power grid, leaving millions without light, heat, or water. This past winter was even worse, with thousands of drones and missiles targeting cities and power stations. Ukraine lacks the missile defenses needed to protect all these targets.
Yet visitors to Ukraine consistently hear some version of the same refrain: “We have no choice but to fight if we want to survive.” No Russian soldier believes his country faces a comparable existential threat. As the French and Americans learned in Vietnam, higher stakes can significantly bolster morale.
On the battlefield, Ukraine’s drones have prevented Russian generals from waging their preferred style of war—concentrating armored brigades to break through enemy lines and deploying infantry to seize territory. In this drone-dominated conflict, such maneuvers are suicidal. Russia has been forced into a war of attrition, but this cuts both ways: Ukraine also cannot mass its forces for major breakthroughs.
Russian commanders have adapted, sending small infantry units to infiltrate Ukrainian lines and using civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and even animals to supply troops while limiting armored losses. Ukraine, thanks to its tech-savvy civilians often working in makeshift facilities, holds a qualitative edge in drone technology. This expertise is crucial, as drones now account for 60–70% of casualties in the war.
Ukraine has relentlessly used drones and increasingly its own missiles—like the modified Long Neptune anti-ship missile and Flamingo models—to strike distant Russian command posts, airfields, and ammunition depots. It has hit more than half of Russia’s major oil refineries at least once, reducing their capacity and causing fuel shortages, long lines, and price hikes in some areas. These deep strikes have also disrupted Russian logistics. Furthermore, Ukraine’s sea drones and anti-ship missiles have pushed Russia’s Black Sea fleet away from the coast. Since sinking the flagship Moskva in April 2022, Ukraine has destroyed about two dozen ships, forcing the Russian navy to relocate its headquarters from Sevastopol in Crimea to Novorossiysk on the eastern Black Sea coast.
In short, Russian forces have been unable to use their numerical advantage to seize territory at the pace they did in 2022 (much of which Ukraine retook by year’s end). Since 2024, even in key offensives—such as those against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—Russia’s maximum average daily territorial gains have been limited.Russia’s advances have been limited to just 70 meters, and last year it suffered average monthly casualties of nearly 35,000 troops. Since capturing Avdiivka—which had a prewar population of 30,000—in February 2024, Russia has not taken another major town until this February and has gained only 1.5% of Ukrainian territory. To annex the rest of the Donbas, it would need to break through defensive fortifications and seize the large urban area that includes Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantynivka. Urban warfare is notoriously bloody.
Ukraine faces several challenges, especially troop shortages made worse by draft evasion. While Western media has widely reported on this, it often suggests that Russia’s larger population ensures a steady supply of manpower. In reality, Russia has increasingly turned to recruiting foreign fighters—including from Africa, Cuba, Central Asia, India, and Nepal—and has enlisted thousands of North Korean troops. Despite growing economic strain, Moscow also offers soldiers generous signing bonuses and salaries to encourage enlistment.
Russia has not lost the war. Its economy is not collapsing, and it still possesses significant firepower. Yet its military performance has been disorganized, even with Donald Trump’s pause on direct military aid to Kyiv. This may explain Putin’s latest proposal. He has long defined victory as conquering four provinces: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russia currently fully controls only Luhansk. Now Putin is offering a deal—on the condition that Ukraine hands over the rest of Donetsk.
Although Putin recently claimed that “our troops are advancing all across the line of contact,” he may be realizing that his generals’ reports about “liberating” Kupiansk in Kharkiv province and seizing large parts of Zaporizhzhia are exaggerated. Similarly, Western reports that Ukraine recently pushed Russian forces out of parts of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk provinces assume that Russian commanders’ claims of controlling those areas were accurate.
Despite Trump’s strong criticisms, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejects any political settlement that would grant Putin territory his army has failed to capture. Polls show that although Ukrainians are weary of war, 75% agree with this stance.
Frequently Asked Questions
FAQs Ukraines Resilience and Putins Position
BeginnerLevel Questions
1 Whats this situation about
Its about the ongoing war in Ukraine In 2022 many experts predicted Russia would win quickly but Ukraine has mounted a strong unexpected defense that continues today
2 Why did people think Ukraine would fall so fast
Russia has a much larger military and economy Many analysts underestimated Ukraines will to fight the skill of its military and the speed and scale of Western military aid
3 So has Ukraine won
Not yet The war is ongoing and very difficult However Ukraine has successfully defended its independence reclaimed some territory and severely damaged Russias military reputationoutcomes few predicted at the start
4 What does holding strong mean for Ukraine
It means Ukraine still controls most of its territory its government is functioning and its military continues to fight It has survived the initial onslaught and adapted to a grueling war of attrition
Advanced Strategic Questions
5 Where does this leave Putin strategically
He is in a weakened and risky position His initial goals have failed Hes now locked in a protracted war that has cost Russia heavily in troops equipment and economic isolation with no clear path to a decisive victory
6 What are Putins main problems now
Military High casualties loss of elite units and modern equipment and a stretched less capable force
Economic Sanctions have crippled longterm growth and access to advanced technology
Political The war has unified NATO turned Ukraine into a committed enemy and revealed weaknesses in the Russian military system
Domestic While suppressing dissent he faces the longterm burden of sanctions and managing public perception of a costly stalled war
7 Can Russia still win
It depends on the definition of win A total conquest of Ukraine seems highly unlikely now Russias bestcase scenario may be holding onto some captured territory and calling for a frozen conflict but even that requires sustaining a costly occupation under constant threat
8 What are the risks for Putin inside Russia
The primary risks are longterm economic stagnation growing war fatigue and potential unrest from military families A major battlefield defeat could trigger