The government is facing calls to review a British company’s contract to export high-tech machinery to Armenia, after the Guardian revealed connections to the supply chain supporting Russia’s war effort.
Sanctions experts and the chair of the House of Commons business committee have challenged the decision to grant an export licence to Cygnet Texkimp. The company manufactures machines that produce carbon fibre “prepreg,” a lightweight, durable material with both civilian and military uses.
The machines are reportedly in final assembly at the company’s warehouse in Northwich, Cheshire, and could be shipped within weeks to a new Armenian company called Rydena LLC. Rydena was established two years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by former executives of a firm that has become a key military supplier to the Kremlin.
Cygnet stated it conducted the required end-user checks and received full government approval for the export. Rydena insists it does no business with Russian clients. However, experts say the deal raises serious questions about the effectiveness of UK export controls meant to prevent British companies from inadvertently aiding the war in Ukraine.
‘Indispensable’ for Weaponry
In February 2023, the US Treasury imposed major sanctions targeting 83 entities and 22 individuals, including Umatex—a crucial division of Russia’s state nuclear energy company, Rosatom. The UK sanctioned Umatex later that May.
Umatex was singled out as Russia’s largest producer of carbon fibre, a material the US described as “critical” for Russia’s military. It is used in nearly all defence platforms, including aircraft, vehicles, missiles, and protective gear.
Olena Yurchenko of Ukraine’s Economic Security Council confirmed the material’s importance, calling it “indispensable” for reducing weight and increasing heat resistance in weaponry, such as drones.
Leading a key part of the Kremlin’s war machine carries risks. Umatex’s CEO, Alexander Tyunin, was found dead last year in what Russian authorities called an apparent suicide, continuing a trend of sudden deaths among Russian business figures since the war began.
For most of Tyunin’s tenure, which began in 2016, his deputy was Dmitry Kogan. Kogan left Umatex in January 2023, a year after Russia’s invasion, and later founded Rydena in Yerevan, Armenia.
Armenia, located between Turkey, Iran, and Russia, has been identified in a government report as a hub used by Moscow to indirectly acquire critical military equipment, bypassing Western sanctions.
Kogan is not the only former Umatex executive at Rydena. The company’s ex-director of business development, Alexander Shleynikov, serves as chief financial officer. They were joined in May the following year by Aleksandr Ilichev, an award-winning aerospace composites scientist who led Umatex’s testing laboratory.
Rydena’s website highlights its work in aerospace, drones, and automotive sectors, even hinting at space ventures. “If you”If you want to go to Mars, we know how to make your spaceship lighter,” the company states on its website. Rydena claims its machinery is for “civilian industrial production,” adding that it does not manufacture military equipment or conduct business with companies in Russia or any other sanctioned jurisdictions.
However, corporate records show that its leaders maintain ongoing connections to Russia. Kogan and Shleynikov are also directors of a Cyprus-based company, Rydena Holding Ltd. Both listed Moscow addresses in documents filed with the Cypriot corporate register in August of this year.
Yurchenko expressed serious concerns about the duo’s past employment at Umatex. “Anyone who worked there, especially in a senior role, was part of the Russian war machine,” she said. “Sanctions and isolation from Western technology only increase Umatex’s need for complex equipment import schemes—both to maintain existing operations and to expand production to meet the growing demands of the military-industrial complex. Anyone exporting machinery to their new company, or approving that export license, should be absolutely certain there is no remaining connection.”
‘Clear Diversion Risk’
Information about Rydena’s leadership and their past work for Umatex was publicly available when Cygnet accepted the contract, valued at over £4 million, in February 2025. Cygnet received an export license later that year.
Both Cygnet and the UK government declined to answer the Guardian’s questions about whether they were aware of the Umatex link. Cygnet stated it was informed by the government that officials had “no specific concerns” about the contract and that it “undertook detailed end-user checks required by export controls and received full export approval.”
The company’s lawyers added: “Rydena signed a certificate of undertaking that the goods would not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.”
Sanctions expert Anna Bradshaw warned that such an end-user undertaking may offer little practical assurance that the machinery or its technical information won’t be diverted to Russia. “There is a clear diversion risk, and if the response is that this is mitigated by an end-user statement, that’s very worrying. Everyone knows an end-user undertaking is a limited remedy. If it’s breached, the ship has sailed.”
Cygnet has already sent technical drawings to Rydena as part of the design and assembly process and has agreed to provide manuals translated into Russian—a language commonly used in Armenian industry. Export is expected by April or early May.
‘A Bunch of Red Flags’
In 2016, Cygnet’s owner, Matthew Kimpton-Smith, suffered a cardiac arrest while cycling. According to the company’s website, the devout Christian is “100% convinced that the Lord saved him for a reason.” The following year, he donated £2,500 to the Conservative party through the office of his local MP, Esther McVey, according to Electoral Commission records.
Although not directly involved in daily operations, Kimpton-Smith has overseen a period of success for Cygnet, founded by his parents in 1974. The group reported sales of £18.7 million last year, working with high-profile clients like the sports car manufacturer McLaren. Unusually for a company of its size, Cygnet was mentioned in the advanced manufacturing section of the government’s industrial strategy published last year.
Cygnet Texkimp, which generates the majority of the group’s revenue, describes itself as an “export-led” business, supplying sectors including aerospace, industrial, and defense.
There is no suggestion that Cygnet has violated UK export licensing rules. However, the Umatex connection highlights the challenges in monitoring the flow of goods and components into Russia.Russia and countries like Armenia, which could serve as staging posts, are under scrutiny. The process for obtaining an export license involves input from multiple government departments, including security services. However, a government spokesperson declined to comment on whether officials had investigated Rydena’s connection to Umatex. Cygnet also declined to comment on whether it was aware of this link.
Liam Byrne MP, who chairs the select committee overseeing the business department, stated, “There are a bunch of red flags here, and the government must explain what it did to assure itself that this was all fine. We’re deeply concerned that the government’s enforcement posture is not in the right place.” Byrne is expected to write to the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) to inquire about its knowledge of Rydena’s ties to Umatex.
In a statement, Cygnet said it “engages proactively with the UK government on all matters of export control. In recent years, we have met several times to discuss this subject with senior cabinet and shadow ministers, including those representing the DBT.” The company emphasized that it “takes great care to adhere at all times to the UK government’s export rules. In the case of our contract with Rydena, as in all other cases, we undertook detailed end-user checks required by export controls and received full export approval. Rydena has provided an end-user undertaking and certified its end use of our technology, which the UK government has approved. This confirms Rydena’s intended use of our technology in the automotive, marine, sports, civil aerospace, and tooling sectors within the European market. Our considerable heritage is built on integrity in everything we do, and this includes our work with customers, partners, colleagues, and governments.”
Rydena stated that the machines were “intended for use in civilian industrial production” and that it does not participate, directly or indirectly, in defence-related projects. The company added that it has no business links with Russian companies or government entities, and its executives have no ties to companies under sanctions nor have they worked for organizations that were under sanctions at the time. It also noted that exporting controlled products from Armenia, such as dual-use goods like carbon fibre prepregs, requires a permit and end-use verification.
A DBT spokesperson said: “The UK operates one of the most robust export control regimes anywhere in the world, and all export licensing decisions are made in line with our strict criteria. We have also banned the export of thousands of products to Russia and, together with our international partners, have implemented the most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy.”
Frequently Asked Questions
Of course Here is a list of FAQs about concerns regarding UK exports to a company connected to Russias military operations written in a natural tone with clear direct answers
BeginnerLevel Questions
1 Whats the basic story here
UK authorities and experts have discovered that Britishmade goods and technology which are subject to strict export bans to Russia have been shipped to other countries and then ended up with a Russian company that supplies the military This means the sanctions are being bypassed
2 Which Russian company is involved
The company is ODKKlimov based in St Petersburg It is a key manufacturer of engines for Russian military helicopters and drones used in the war in Ukraine
3 What kind of UK goods are we talking about
Items include specialized machine tools electronics and advanced manufacturing equipment that can be used to repair maintain and produce military hardware
4 Why is this a problem if the UK isnt selling directly to Russia
Because it undermines the entire purpose of sanctions The goal is to cripple Russias ability to wage war by cutting off access to vital technology If goods can be rerouted through third countries the sanctions become ineffective
5 How did this happen
Goods were legally exported from the UK to countries like Turkey the UAE China and others From there they were either knowingly or unknowingly reexported to Russia exploiting gaps in enforcement and customs checks in those transit countries
Advanced Detailed Questions
6 Isnt this illegal What are the specific rules
Yes it is illegal under UK and allied sanctions regimes Since Russias invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the UK has banned the export of all dualuse goods and specific hightech goods to Russia Exporters have a legal responsibility to ensure their goods do not end up in Russia
7 What is dualuse and why is it so tricky
Dualuse refers to items software or technology that can be used for both civilian and military purposes A highprecision lathe or a specific chemical might be used in a car factory or a weapons plant This makes policing exports very complex as bad actors can claim a civilian enduse
