Finally, in the dead of night, the threat from above has passed. The rain has eased, and Ukrainian drones are ready, prepared by a ground crew using dim green and red lights that are hard to detect. A small line of Ukrainian Fire Point FP-2 aircraft—tiny single-wing planes with a 6-metre wingspan and over 100kg of explosives—waits to launch an attack on occupied Luhansk, more than 200 miles away. The drone’s main piston engine makes the familiar buzz of a scooter, but its launch booster is different. The jet sound echoes, almost painfully. A burst of fire shoots into the distance, and the last one signals that Ukraine’s 413 Raid drone regiment should pack up and leave.
The launch of an FP-2 drone during the mission into occupied Luhansk.
This scene now happens every night with dozens of Ukrainian crews, showing a rapidly changing conflict that started with tanks, then artillery, but is now moving beyond the first generation of drones. Death and destruction are delivered by new weapons in growing numbers, hundreds of miles past the frontline, at military, industrial, and economic targets that also affect civilians. But just as Ukraine has built up its drone and missile capabilities to almost match Russia’s—after its cities were sometimes hit by hundreds of drone strikes a day—Moscow has transformed its drone arsenal with a jet-powered revolution. The balance of power remains unclear.
Pilots of the 413 Raid drone regiment preparing an FP-2 for launch.
Raid is a specialized drone unit, created two years ago, and has been using Ukrainian-designed and built FP-2 attack drones since last autumn, according to Skipper, a former corporate IT worker with a master’s in computer science who is now one of its commanders. If, he says, there was only one crew that could run two missions a week when they started, today he says “we can do 10 times more, or even more.” Speaking in a car as the rain pours down, Skipper warns there is “a flipside” when asked if long-distance wars are easier to fight because nobody has to be killed visibly. “They can do it as well,” he says—Raid’s crew are targets too. “Maybe you don’t see the enemy with your own eyes, but still it’s a very dangerous game,” he adds. The FP-2 was only first publicly acknowledged by Ukraine last September. It is designed to attack hardened targets at a mid-range, to disrupt Russian logistics to the frontline. The success of Raid and others engaged in mid-strike bombing has helped slow the invaders’ advance to a near halt. Russia gained a modest 90 square kilometres of Ukraine in August, compared with 505 sq km a year earlier, and western officials estimate it is losing 6,000 more soldiers a month than it can recruit.
Ukrainian drones and missiles chart.
In Ukraine’s sprawling military, the specialist drone units of the Unmanned System Forces, including Raid regiment, work and overlap with army units working closer to the frontline and special forces. A major attack, such as the attack that disabled the Moscow refinery about 300 miles from the border on 20 September, involves several working at once. A long-range attack could involve launching up to 300 drones, though the target is to be able to launch 1,000 a night, in what soldiers describe as an “orchestra,” where cheap drones identify an air corridor towards the final target.
An employee walks past a plume of smoke rising from a fire at the Russian e-commerce firm Wildberries’ logistics complex near the town of Podolsk, outside Moscow, on 16 August. Photograph: Tatyana Makeyeva/AFP/Getty Images.
The long-range, $75,000 FP-1, sister to the FP-2, has been used to repeatedly attack warehouses, refineries and other military-economic sites at a depth of 1,800 miles inside Russia, causing the country’s crude oil production to fall by 7.7% in a year, according to figures from the International Energy Agency.and interest rates to stay at 14%. “Both sides are getting better at turning deep strikes into economic damage,” says Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute.
A refinery burns in Moscow after Ukrainian drone strikes, 21 September. Photograph: EyePress News/Shutterstock
Mission planning is rarely shown, but a short-range drone unit on the eastern Donetsk front – Unit 17, Special Operations Centre – is happy to show their war work from their dacha. Znakhar, 33, a software coder before the full Russian invasion, is one of a squad of English-speaking men in their early 30s. During the day, he clicks on fresh, static targets – artillery, electronic jamming systems – that have been added to a shared system from western satellites or Ukrainian reconnaissance drones, studying their pictures for extra information.
Pilots of Unit 17, Special Operations Centre, posing for a portrait next to a Sych mid-strike drone
The temporary base of pilots of Unit 17, Special Operations Centre. Right: the ‘drop bombs’ Unit 17 used for middle strikes
At night, the crew use a $25,000 Sych drone, which looks like a large model aeroplane. If the rain holds off, they can fly two to six bombing runs, dozens of miles behind enemy lines. Znakhar, whose call sign means healer or herbalist, draws up an initial flight path in seconds with a few clicks on a map, then adjusts the route to avoid population centres, high ground and known interceptor drone launch sites. What’s changed recently? “More drones,” he says. “Russian drones.” Colleagues such as Ananas, 30, head out at night, taking more precautions than they did when the unit started drone work two years ago, preparing launches underground where once they could work in a field. He studied architecture, then worked as a 3D artist in a video game studio. “I play a lot of video games,” he says, “so I’m good with a gamepad. It’s a big plus because now I’m a pilot.” It’s a narrowing of the gap between fiction and reality.
On the other side, Moscow always has ballistic and cruise missiles available, allowing it to bomb anywhere inside Ukraine since February 2022. It imported delta-winged Shahed drones from Iran in the war’s first year to boost its long-range attack numbers, and developed a family of cheap battlefield drones plus its own version of the Shahed. But since May there has been a notable set of upgrades, allowing Russian forces to strike Ukraine more effectively with fast, jet-engined drones, combined with a new ruthlessness of targeting.
Firefighters working at the site of a Russian drone strike on a Kyiv business centre on 23 September
“Russia never stops,” Serhii Beskrestnov, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s defence technology adviser, said during an interview in Kyiv punctuated by an air raid and explosions in the distance. The original Iranian delta wing Shahed (known by Russia as the Geran-2) has been redesigned and a jet engine added. The new Geran-4, with more aerodynamic wings, flies at anywhere from 300km/h (186mph) to 550km/h, while the cigar-shaped Geran-5 is even faster, at closer to 600km/h. It is similar in speed to a new light cruise missile, the Banderol. The prediction is that Russia will make 36,000 jet Shaheds in 2027, a further 10,000 Banderols, plus a similar number of cheap cruise missiles, the Dan-T. All could be used to bomb Ukraine’s strained electricity, heating and water systems this winter.
Russian drones and missiles chart
The new weapons, whose Telefly engines are made in China, are faster than the Ukrainian interceptors, designed to stop the old piston-engined Shahed Geran-2s. Shahed interception rates, once over 90%, are down to 60% against Russia’s newer models, with predictable results.
The aftermath of a Russian attack on ammunition storage in Myla village, Kyiv region, in August
A mix of jet- and traditJet-powered drones launched a rare morning attack on central Kyiv on Wednesday, bombing a market near the main railway station and business district, killing two people and injuring 41. At the end of August, a Geran-4 drone hit an ammunition depot at Myla, outside Kyiv, killing 38 people and destroying nearby homes. Another struck the SBU domestic intelligence agency in central Kyiv, though it may have been guided in its final stage by a Russian agent on the ground. Food supplies in Kyiv supermarkets are inconsistent after repeated attacks on warehouses in August; petrol stations in the capital were targeted in early September.
The aftermath of a Russian Geran-5-type jet-powered drone strike on an Ukrnafta petrol station in the Holosiivskyi district of Kyiv, 15 September. Photograph: Libkos/Getty Images
Ukrainian military propaganda is very good at highlighting successful missions on social media, but the broader impact of its drone strikes on Russia is harder to see. “This spring we had a really good run and almost every night we could see one, two, three, four systems destroyed,” Skipper says. “Since June, July, they are just hiding.” Other Ukrainian military sources stress that Russia has improved its jamming capabilities, and cheap strike drones are simply not as accurate now. In this long-distance war, civilian casualties are rising. New UN figures show 2,222 people killed in Ukraine during the first eight months of 2026, more than in all of 2025. In August, 368 were killed in Ukraine and another 113 reported dead in Russia. Warehouses owned by Ukrainian supermarkets, its Nova Poshta postal service and e-commerce companies were hit at least 32 times. Wildberries and Ozon warehouses in Russia were bombed 17 times by Ukraine.
Firefighters at a warehouse in the Kyiv region after a Russian attack
The impact could be harder for Ukraine. “Russia has advantages that Ukraine does not,” says Kaushal. “A more diversified range of long-range weapons, more of an air defence network and more slack as a society, because its people have not faced so much pressure for so long.” Ukraine, meanwhile, faces economic pressure at a time when its war budget is overspent and it needs to find £40bn more next year. Yet, though the war is escalating as the technology changes, neither side is close to defeat or a crisis. Tests will come if Russia tries to mobilise up to 300,000 men after parliamentary elections – and as Ukraine tries again to refinance and, most urgently, get through the winter. Back in their soldiers’ dacha, Ananas and Znakhar wonder if the war will ever end. “Sometimes I catch this feeling,” Ananas admits, then Znakhar comes in: “We just need to hang on one more day than them.”
Frequently Asked Questions
FAQs The LongRange Drone War Between Ukraine and Russia
1 What is the longrange drone war
Its the ongoing fight between Ukraine and Russia to strike targets far behind the front lines using drones often hundreds of kilometers away rather than just fighting tanktotank on the battlefield
2 What kinds of drones are used
Two main types oneway kamikaze attack drones that crash into targets with explosives and longrange reconnaissance drones that spot targets for missiles or other drones
3 Why are drones so important in this war
Theyre cheap hard to shoot down and can hit deep targets without risking pilots A drone costing a few thousand dollars can destroy equipment worth millions
4 How far can these drones fly
Most strike drones range from about 300 to 1500 kilometers Ukraine has hit targets over 1000 km inside Russia including oil refineries and airbases
5 Why is it called a competition for control of the skies
Neither side can safely fly manned aircraft over the others territory because of dense air defenses So both sides use drones to contest the airspace and strike from a distance instead
6 What are drones mainly used to attack
Energy infrastructure oil refineries airbases weapons factories radar systems and military supply hubs
7 How do countries defend against these drones
With layered defenses radar to detect them electronic jamming to disrupt navigation and cheap interceptors guns missiles and even other drones to shoot them down
8 Why are drones hard to stop
They fly low and slow are made of cheap materials and often launch in large waves Defenders may spend a 500000 missile to down a 20000 drone which isnt sustainable
9 What is electronic warfares role
Jamming GPS and radio signals can make drones miss or crash Both sides constantly upgrade their jamming and counterjamming making it a fastmoving tech race
10 Cant Russia just use its air force instead
Russia has more planes but Ukraines air defenses make flying deep into Ukrainian territory very risky Drones let Russia strike without losing expensive jets and pilots
