The question of the UK’s relationship with the EU has come back into focus as Keir Starmer’s time as prime minister nears its end and Andy Burnham, his likely successor, prepares to enter Downing Street. Wes Streeting, who was until recently a contender for the top job and is now a possible future chancellor, went so far as to say recently that Britain should rejoin the EU.
The “rejoin” debate in the UK has focused narrowly and insularly on two things. First, the cost Brexit has imposed on the UK economy, and second, the price of rejoining—specifically, whether the UK could regain its previous opt-outs from the Euro and Schengen areas.
But this discussion fails to address the bigger international and far more serious questions: what has the EU become now, and is it a club that UK political elites and the public would or should want to rejoin?
The EU of 2026 is an organisation built increasingly on shared borrowing, an assertive joint industrial policy, and a growing role in security and defence that encroaches on the traditional powers of nation states. It is also an EU that is taking a far more assertive stance toward the US and China than the British government. Understanding these changes should be the central focus of any rejoin debate in the UK.
In the years since the UK left, the EU has in some ways changed beyond recognition. Faced with a series of shocks and crises, the remaining 27 governments have responded with significant levels of joint debt backed by the EU budget. To deal with the consequences of Covid, the EU borrowed €100bn from capital markets, which it then lent to member states to support their furlough programmes. As the pandemic worsened, the EU borrowed a further €750bn, most of which was passed on to the 27 governments as grants for green and digital investments.
The US’s retreat from its promise to keep Europe secure prompted the European Commission to borrow €150bn to support more defence-industrial collaboration between EU members through the Security Action for Europe (Safe) initiative. Much of the EU’s aid to Ukraine has been funded in similar ways.
This represents one of the most profound shifts in the history of European integration. Common borrowing is not just a new financing tool but a form of quasi-political and fiscal integration that many Eurosceptics long warned the EU would eventually pursue. Had the UK remained a member, it would almost certainly have opposed it. In many cases, it sought to veto or significantly dilute any moves in this direction.
And common debt will be the EU’s tool of choice for responding to future shocks. As part of the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034, Brussels has proposed creating a permanent fiscal capacity that would allow it to borrow from capital markets whenever needed. More shared borrowing will require more supranational taxation. That is why the commission is also pushing for more EU-wide corporate and digital taxes to help repay the EU’s growing debt.
The EU of 2026 is also more interventionist and protectionist when it comes to its single market. Its increasingly permissive approach to state aid, along with instruments like the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act—designed to boost Europe’s strategic industries and counter unfair Chinese competition and supply-chain dominance—and Safe, reflect a new willingness to use industrial policy as a geopolitical tool. Brussels has targeted Chinese overcapacity and restricted US firms’ access to EU defence financing through “buy European” requirements aimed at strengthening Europe’s own industrial base and the continent’s strategic autonomy.
Under both Conservative andHistorically, UK Labour governments opposed closer European fiscal integration, large-scale supranational borrowing, and an activist EU industrial policy, preferring open markets instead. Successive British governments also chose to maintain close economic, security, and strategic ties with Washington, while balancing increasingly tough rhetoric on China with continued economic pragmatism. The EU’s stance toward both the US and China is becoming much more confrontational.
The EU’s growing push for technological sovereignty marks another shift away from British instincts. The Commission’s tech sovereignty package reflects a stronger determination to reduce the EU’s reliance on Silicon Valley providers. While the UK shares some of the EU’s concerns, British governments have been more comfortable operating within a US-led technology ecosystem, favoring transatlantic cooperation on these issues.
Artificial intelligence may be the clearest example of divergence in tech policy. While the EU has led with comprehensive regulation, the UK has deliberately marketed itself as a lighter-touch alternative, arguing that freedom from EU rules makes it more attractive for AI investment and innovation.
Institutionally, too, the EU is moving away from traditional British preferences. The arrival of Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, has given senior EU officials a chance to move away from national vetoes in EU law-making on issues like foreign policy, sanctions, and even EU enlargement—toward a majority voting approach long championed by Brussels, Paris, and other advocates of a more sovereign Europe.
These developments aren’t necessarily wrong for the EU. Nor should they mean the UK shouldn’t try to rejoin, or that a future British government couldn’t pull the EU back toward a more liberal direction from within. But any serious debate about rejoining must start with an honest assessment of what the EU has become.
The real question is no longer whether Britain could recover its old opt-outs and budget rebates, but whether it’s prepared to join a union that is more fiscally integrated, more interventionist, more geopolitical, and in many ways, markedly less British than the one it left.
Mujtaba Rahman is the managing director for Europe at Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm.
Frequently Asked Questions
Here is a list of FAQs about the claim that the EU the UK left no longer exists written in a natural tone with clear direct answers
BeginnerLevel Questions
Q I heard someone say the EU the UK left no longer exists Is that true Did the EU break up
A No the EU did not break up The European Union still exists and has 27 member countries The phrase means that the specific version of the EU the UK was a member of has changed mostly because the UK itself is no longer in it
Q So the EU is still a thing Is it the same as before Brexit
A Yes the EU is still a thing Its not exactly the sameit has one fewer member and its rules budgets and priorities have shifted slightly But its the same organization with the same basic structure and goals
Q If the EU changed does that mean Brexit was pointless
A Not necessarily The EU changed because the UK left not the other way around The EU adapted but its core mission remains Brexit was about the UK choosing a different path not about the EU disappearing
IntermediateLevel Questions
Q People say the EU the UK left is gone What exactly changed in the EU after Brexit
A The main changes are
No UK voice The EU no longer has a major net contributor a permanent UN Security Council member or a big military power at the table
Budget gap The EU lost a large net contributor so it had to adjust its budget
New rules The EU tightened some rules to prevent the UK from undercutting them
Policy shift The EU became more focused on strategic autonomy and less reliant on the UK for defense and foreign policy
Q Does this mean the EU is weaker or stronger without the UK
