Beti Hohler is a Slovenian national living in the Netherlands. Like tens of millions of other Europeans, she uses Apple’s app store and has an Amazon account. When she travels for work or leisure, she might book a place on Airbnb or Booking, using a credit card from Visa or Mastercard, possibly through PayPal.
But when the Trump administration sanctioned her last year for her work as a judge at the International Criminal Court (ICC), her ability to use any of these services disappeared overnight. Her credit cards and her accounts with US companies were all gone. The sanctions against Hohler and some of her colleagues mean they live in “constant uncertainty,” she said.
The ICC judges’ ordeal is an extreme example of a reality Europe is starting to face: the Trump administration’s confrontational political approach toward the EU has exposed the continent’s dangerous dependence on US technology.
The dominance of the US tech market is nothing new. What’s increasingly dangerous is that this technological power could be used against Europe politically. Elon Musk has already used his ownership of X and Starlink to interfere in European public debate and influence the war in Ukraine. And the US government has ordered the AI company Anthropic to limit foreign nationals’ access to its products for security reasons.
What if Washington cut off Europe’s access to US advanced chips during a trade dispute, or used its control of social media and cloud computing to spy on European governments and influence elections? Given that the EU relies on non-EU countries for more than 80% of its technology and 70% of its cloud computing, and considering the Trump administration’s commitment to “cultivating resistance” in Europe, none of this seems too far-fetched.
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In response to these dangers, the European Commission published its highly anticipated digital “sovereignty package” to boost homegrown European technologies and protect the EU from foreign interference. Overall, last week’s package is a welcome, if belated, recognition that dependence on US tech companies isn’t just an economic problem – it’s a direct threat to the continent’s independence, resilience, and security.
Its centerpiece is the Cloud and AI Development Act (Cada), which would create a ranking system for cloud providers handling public-sector data – such as Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, or France’s OVHCloud. In theory, the most sensitive operations and data – especially those related to national security and law enforcement – would be reserved for providers that meet the highest sovereignty standards, establishing a clear preference for European providers.
While the framework may help protect Europeans from foreign surveillance and give a small boost to European cloud alternatives, it is undermined by some major flaws. For one, the strictest assurance level – the only one where US big tech would be banned from bidding for contracts – will only apply to a narrow segment of public-sector cloud procurement, which in turn represents only a small fraction of overall European cloud spending.
Worse still, Cada’s enforcement would be delegated to individual EU governments, many of which have strong incentives to implement the rules weakly in order to attract US tech investment or avoid US government pressure. This would repeat the unfortunate experience of the EU’s data protection rulebook, where Ireland’s financial dependence on big tech’s investments and tax payments has led to systematic underenforcement.
The Commission’s approach on AI highlights a more fundamental problem. Rather than establishing how careful, targeted, and evidence-based AI adoption could help the EU achieve its policy goals while minimizing societal harm, Brussels largely defers to theThe AI vision promoted by major US tech companies and backed by the Trump administration treats AI as an end in itself, aiming to roll it out as fast as possible without caring about the consequences for society or the planet. Compare this to Pope Leo’s recent encyclical on AI, which says that when technology advances without matching ethical and social progress, we end up with more tools but no real growth in humanity.
The European Commission’s proposals fail to critically examine AI’s potential benefits, risks, and technical limits. Instead, they simply assume AI will have a positive impact, without offering much evidence. This short-sighted approach also shapes much of the EU’s overall tech strategy, including rushed plans to weaken EU data privacy and AI safety rules in a misguided effort to “catch up” with the US.
This shaky reasoning is behind the Commission’s commitment to triple Europe’s data center capacity over five to seven years, mainly through measures in the AI Act that require every EU country to set up “data center acceleration zones.” In these zones, local authorities would have to approve data center applications within 12 months, even if that means cutting back on environmental and planning reviews to speed up permits.
These acceleration zones raise serious concerns about transparency, democratic accountability, and sustainability, especially as public opposition to data centers grows due to their impact on the environment and household electricity bills. They also risk undermining the Commission’s own goals for sovereignty. By not including criteria about company size or nationality, these zones could end up strengthening the US hyperscalers that already dominate Europe’s cloud market.
Brussels fails to see that digital sovereignty isn’t just about who owns or controls your technology. It’s also about having an independent vision for how that technology is designed, developed, and used. If Europe truly wants to be sovereign, it needs to break free from Silicon Valley’s ideology, not just its technology. Without its own vision for how AI should serve society, Europe will remain a follower, not a leader.
Max von Thun is the director of Open Markets Institute Europe, an anti-monopoly think tank.
Frequently Asked Questions
Here is a list of FAQs about Europe distancing itself from US big tech while still following a similar playbook
BeginnerLevel Questions
1 What does it mean that Europe is distancing itself from US big tech
It means European regulators and governments are passing stricter laws to limit the power of companies like Google Apple and Meta They are also investing in their own cloud services and social media alternatives
2 Why is Europe doing this
Mainly for three reasons data sovereignty economic competition and security
3 What is the Silicon Valley playbook that Europe is still following
The playbook includes things like building centralized platforms using venture capital funding prioritizing rapid growth over privacy and creating walled gardens
4 Can you give an example of Europe doing this
Sure The EU is funding GaiaX to compete with AWS and Azure But GaiaX still uses many of the same technologies and business models as the US cloud giants
5 Is this just about privacy
No While privacy is a big driver its also about money and power Europe wants a piece of the trilliondollar tech market not just to regulate it
IntermediateLevel Questions
6 If Europe is distancing itself why are they still copying the same business model
Because the platform model is the most profitable way to build tech European startups often end up mimicking US giants because investors demand the same highgrowth winnertakeall approach
7 Whats a realworld example of a European company following the US playbook
Spotify is a great example Its a massive centralized platform that uses data to recommend content and controls the relationship between artists and listenersvery similar to how Apple or Google operate
8 What is the Souveraineté numérique movement
Its a Frenchled push for digital sovereignty It encourages using European cloud providers and opensource software However many of these providers still rely on US chips and
