Twenty-five years ago, on September 11, Osama bin Laden traveled with a small group of al-Qaida loyalists and aides to a remote spot in eastern Afghanistan. His convoy of SUVs was joined by a minivan that had been converted into a makeshift communications center.
The van’s basic equipment didn’t let Bin Laden watch the 19 men he had begun sending to the US more than a year earlier fly planes into the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon near Washington DC, killing about 3,000 people. But he listened as shocked radio announcers broke the news.
Within days of the attack, then-president George W Bush had started framing the US response as a global “war on terror” — a clumsy, inappropriate and counterproductive strategic choice.
For those of us reporting from the ground during this period — watching US bombers over Afghan mountains and tanks in Baghdad streets, interviewing would-be suicide bombers or victims of attacks by extremist groups that multiplied from the UK to the Philippines — the errors and failures of this “war on terror” were glaring.
This unprecedented and indiscriminate series of campaigns would lead to invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, involve torture, renditions and alliances with dubious regimes, cost enormous sums of money, destabilize large parts of the Middle East and bring suffering to millions.
Was this what Bin Laden had hoped to achieve?
It is often suggested that Bin Laden’s aim with the 9/11 attacks was to draw the US into wars that would weaken its economy and lead to its eventual collapse, much as the Soviet Union had been fatally drained by the war in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. As a young militant, Bin Laden had witnessed this conflict and even taken part in it, though in a marginal role.
View image in fullscreenOsama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998, three years before the 9/11 attacks. Photograph: Associated Press
But there is little evidence to support this theory. Though Bin Laden was undoubtedly inspired by the earlier conflict, he dismissed as unrealistic his aides’ warnings that the planned attack would bring US troops to Afghanistan, probably expecting little more than another barrage of ineffective missiles in retaliation. Certainly, he had no plan when the US troops did come. Within months of the attacks, shaken al-Qaida members described “misfortune [and] disaster”.
In reality, Bin Laden had a different strategy. He wanted to weaken the US economically and thereby force a withdrawal from the Middle East, not an invasion. In 2004, he boasted that al-Qaida was “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy”, and that every dollar the group spent attacking the US had cost Washington a million dollars in economic fallout and military spending. This lecture on the advantages of asymmetric warfare still resonates today, but it was wildly optimistic.
The most costly single event for the US would have been another successful major attack. This never came — an undeniable success of US policymaking since 9/11 and a major failure for al-Qaida. And despite the obvious economic problems in the US, no one could argue that the country has suffered a fate similar to the USSR’s. Nor, obviously, has it withdrawn its forces from the Middle East.
A second objective of Bin Laden was to force the US to end its support for all the rulers in the region that the once-privileged, Saudi-born dissident so hated, starting with the al-Saud family.
Some of Bin Laden’s targets have fallen since 2001, but not because of his actions or anyone aligned with his vision. Muammar Gaddafi was deposed and killed by western-backed rebels, Saddam Hussein was ousted by the US, and the Assad dynasty’s rule was ended by an al-Qaida veteran who explicitly disavowed the group’s ideology and agenda.
A third aim of Bin Laden was propaganda. His theater of terror was designed to send a bloody, spectacular and unforgettable message that would radicalize his followers, mobilize new ones and divide communities. He emphasized how attacks such as 9/11 were “just reactions to what the”Here is the text rewritten in fluent, natural English:
This is happening to our children in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, southern Sudan, and Kashmir, and he called for Muslims worldwide to rise up against their enemies.
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Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and members of the national security team receive an update on the mission against Osama bin Laden in the Situation Room of the White House, 1 May 2011. Photograph: The White House/Getty Images
The 9/11 attacks certainly drew international attention to conflicts where Bin Laden believed Muslims were oppressed by the West or its allies, but they brought no real improvement for the victims. Support for Bin Laden and interest in extremist Islamism peaked just a few years after 2001, then quickly faded almost everywhere. Shortly before US Navy Seals killed him in Pakistan, Bin Laden was considering rebranding al-Qaida, whose name had been damaged by growing criticism within the Islamic world that it was killing large numbers of Muslims. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egypt, abandoned the idea of a global uprising and shifted to a strategy focused on local rather than global goals.
In 2014, the Islamic State managed to exploit the chaos left by the US invasion of Iraq, sectarian tensions, and other factors to establish its horrific caliphate in Iraq and Syria. But even that was over by 2019.
Since then, this kind of extremism has been largely confined to the edges of the Islamic world and to regions where the threat to developed countries is at best sporadic. Al-Qaida and the Islamic State have grown most effectively in sub-Saharan Africa, taking advantage of anarchy, failed states, demographic pressures, competition for scarce resources, and Western neglect.
Some analysts add up the estimated strength of groups in Somalia or Mali that have loose, historical ties to al-Qaida and warn that their total membership is larger than those loyal to Bin Laden in 2001. But these few thousand young men with AK-47s have little in common with the organization Bin Laden led 25 years ago, in either goals or capabilities.
There are still horrific attacks inspired by Bin Laden’s twisted ideology, and there will certainly be more. This is partly due to the polarization caused by his violence and the reaction to it—which was exactly what he wanted.
But it’s worth noting that neither al-Qaida nor IS has prominent charismatic leaders. One reason is that any such figure would be quickly killed by the far more capable US, making it risky to be identified. But it’s also because the era when such individuals could command a significant following is over.
It’s often said that for an insurgent or terrorist group to win, it only needs to survive, but there are exceptions. That al-Qaida still exists is an achievement of sorts for the group and, posthumously, for its founder. But it should not be called a victory.
Jason Burke is the Guardian’s international security correspondent and the author of The Revolutionists: The Story of the Extremists who Hijacked the 1970s.
Frequently Asked Questions
FAQs Osama bin Laden 911 and Why His Broader Plans Failed
Beginner Questions
Who was Osama bin Laden
He was the founder of alQaeda the terrorist group that carried out the 911 attacks He was born into a wealthy Saudi family and later became the worlds most wanted terrorist
What happened on 911
On September 11 2001 alQaeda hijackers flew two planes into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon near Washington DC A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers fought back Nearly 3000 people died
Why did bin Laden attack the United States
He opposed US military presence in the Middle East US support for Israel and the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia He wanted to drive Western influence out of Muslim countries
What did bin Laden actually want to achieve
He wanted to topple USbacked governments in the Middle East expel Western forces from the region and establish a strict Islamist order He hoped 911 would trigger a global uprising of Muslims against the West
How was bin Laden killed
US Navy SEALs killed him in Abbottabad Pakistan on May 2 2011 during a raid on his hideout He had been in hiding for nearly a decade
Advanced Questions
Why did bin Ladens broader plans fail
He expected Muslims worldwide to rise up against the West Instead most governments and ordinary Muslims condemned 911 AlQaeda lost its safe haven in Afghanistan its leaders were killed or captured and its message alienated far more people than it attracted
What did the US invasion of Afghanistan do to alQaeda
It destroyed alQaedas training camps and forced its leadership underground Bin Laden spent his final years isolated unable to direct large operations and reduced to sending messages by courier
Did bin Ladens attacks achieve any of his political goals
No The US deepened its military presence in the Middle East rather than leaving No allied government fell because of 911 and no Islamist state was established as he envisioned
Why did so few Muslims join his cause
AlQaedas tacticskilling civilians including Muslims
