After a year of Donald Trump’s second term and two Munich Security Conferences, it is now clear that Europe will have to defend itself in the future with less support from the United States—likely much less, and possibly, with a gulp, none at all.
European leaders acknowledge the need to reduce their overreliance on the US. Yet many, including Keir Starmer and to some extent Friedrich Merz, still cling to the remnants of the transatlantic relationship. They hope, rather than firmly believe, that the US would come to Europe’s aid if Russia attacked NATO territory. But who truly thinks that Donald Trump, who favors short displays of American power, would commit US forces to an open-ended war in Europe—with potential nuclear risks—if Vladimir Putin suddenly seized a Russian-speaking border town in Estonia or Norway’s Arctic archipelago of Svalbard?
All European governments now understand they must take responsibility for defending Europe, potentially on their own. This will require a decade of significantly increased military spending, which polls show the public broadly supports so far. However, several European states—including the UK, France, and Italy—are in too fragile a fiscal position to fund a major defense buildup without substantial joint borrowing, something Germany is unwilling to consider.
Buying more weapons is only one part of building a credible, more independent European defense. It requires high-profile capabilities like satellites, fighter jets, and frigates that politicians love to showcase. But it also demands many unglamorous essentials they are less eager to fund, such as ammunition, spare parts, logistics, training, exercises, and a significant expansion of the armed forces—potentially including selective conscription.
Just as importantly, Europe needs a new leadership structure to make timely decisions to counter aggression. Four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have shown that neither NATO nor the EU can be relied upon to respond swiftly and effectively.
NATO is dominated by the US and cannot act when Washington chooses not to be involved. It worked hard to avoid direct support for Kyiv in 2022, rejecting Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s pleas to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. NATO only took over coordinating military supplies for Ukraine from the US last year. The EU, for its part, imposed rapid financial and economic sanctions on Moscow and helped reduce dependence on Russian gas. But it is not a defense organization, and pro-Russian outlier Hungary has delayed subsequent sanctions packages and financial aid to Kyiv.
At last weekend’s Munich Security Conference, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Friedrich Merz both emphasized the need to activate the EU’s mutual defense pact (Article 42.7), which on paper is a more binding commitment than NATO’s Article 5. Yet the EU lacks military expertise and has no operational command structure. No serving European general has commanded more than a brigade in combat since the Cold War, with only small forces deployed for expeditionary missions or peacekeeping in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Both the EU and NATO are constrained by the need for unanimous decisions and include difficult members—four militarily non-aligned countries in the EU, and notably the pro-Russian governments of Hungary and Slovakia. Moreover, the EU does not include three countries crucial for Europe’s defense: the UK, Norway, and Turkey.
Neither organization was involved in designing potential security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire agreement. The US did not want NATO involved to avoid complicating its negotiations with Russia.
Instead, France and the UK, Europe’s two nuclear powers…Major powers and UN Security Council members have formed a “coalition of the willing,” consisting of roughly 35 nations. This includes all of Europe’s main military powers, as well as Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. Whether these countries will actually deploy forces in or around Ukraine remains uncertain. That decision depends on Vladimir Putin’s willingness to end the war and on European countries’ still-unclear resolve to commit troops, aircraft, and ships to the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, the coalition shows promise as a potential framework for future European security leadership without guaranteed U.S. support. With an initial operational headquarters in Paris, the group brings together all key countries and organizations—including NATO and the EU—while excluding obstructive members. An inner core, the so-called E3 (France, Germany, and the UK), holds the most influence, which expands to the E6 with the addition of Italy, Spain, and Poland to involve other major European powers. Nordic and Baltic countries, often represented by Denmark or Finland, also carry weight within the group.
For now, the coalition has no legal status, decision-making authority, or secretariat. It is an ad hoc body to which the UK and France have assigned a small number of officials and officers. However, it could evolve into the nucleus of a future European defense union, operating through NATO structures where possible but, if necessary, under coalition command.
One possibility would be to revive the 1955 Western European Union treaty—which was absorbed into the EU in 2010—to provide a legal basis for a European defense union that includes willing EU countries, the UK, and Norway. That process might be too slow for current needs, but if Europe is to defend itself with significantly less U.S. assistance, it will require an agile body capable of shaping and making quick decisions during a crisis. This de facto European security council appears to be the best available option.
Paul Taylor is a senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre.
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions A European Defense Union Without US Backing
BeginnerLevel Questions
1 What is a European Defense Union
Its a proposed framework where European Union countries would significantly integrate their military forces planning and spending to defend themselves collectively reducing reliance on the United States and NATO
2 Why is this being discussed now
Growing geopolitical instability differing strategic priorities between the US and Europe and statements from some US political figures questioning longterm security guarantees have pushed Europe to seriously consider taking more responsibility for its own defense
3 Doesnt NATO already do this
NATO provides collective defense but the US is its dominant military and financial power A European Defense Union would be a deeper EUled initiative focused on building independent European capabilities which would then strengthen NATO as a whole
4 What are the main benefits
Strategic Autonomy Europe could make its own security decisions based on its own interests
Efficiency Reducing duplication by pooling resources and standardizing equipment
Stronger Deterrence A credible unified European force could better deter potential aggressors
Global Role It would allow Europe to act as a more influential and independent global security actor
Advanced Practical Questions
5 What are the biggest hurdles to making this happen
Cost Budgets Major longterm increases in defense spending are required which is politically difficult
Political Will Countries have different threat perceptions and are historically protective of national sovereignty over defense
Industrial Technical Merging complex national defense industries and making different militaries equipment and systems work together seamlessly
Nuclear Deterrence France is the EUs only nuclear power How would its deterrent be integrated or extended to protect the union
6 What would it actually entail What might it look like
It could involve
A permanent EU military headquarters for joint planning and command
A much larger fully integrated EU Rapid Reaction Force
Joint procurement of major systems like air defense fighter jets and naval assets
