In 1972, the great German novelist Heinrich Böll described the campaign of violence launched by the Red Army Faction (RAF) two years earlier as a war of “six against 60 million.” The writer was heavily criticized for this phrase, with some accusing him of sympathizing with bombers and murderers. But Böll had actually highlighted the key reason the group was eventually defeated. One of the last surviving alleged members, a 67-year-old named Daniela Klette, was just sentenced to 13 years in prison for armed robberies.
At the time Böll was writing, the RAF’s bombings, kidnappings, and shootings had caused the most serious crisis for West German democracy since World War II. Dozens were killed, many more were injured, wanted posters and police checkpoints appeared across the country, and huge state resources were spent on counter-terrorism. The group favored sporty small BMW cars so much that they were nicknamed “Baader-Meinhof Wagen,” after the RAF’s most famous founding leaders, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof.
Yet, less than a decade later, the Guardian’s correspondent in West Germany wrote about a new “atmosphere of peace and relaxation.” The RAF’s violent campaign to bring radical, revolutionary change to the country was over, they said. It was “the terror that died more with a whimper than a bang.”
This judgment was a bit early, but not by much. Meinhof took her own life in prison in 1976, and Baader died the same way a year later. A “second generation” of the Red Army Faction carried out increasingly random attacks, aimed more at freeing its members from prison than advancing the global struggle against imperialism and capitalism. In the end, most of them ended up in jail alongside their comrades. A “third generation” continued a half-hearted campaign for another ten years or so. Klette was among its alleged members.
Activists across Europe and beyond have portrayed Klette as a hero in the fight for global and local social justice. She is “a kind of grandmother heroine for the extreme left,” Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler, a German terrorism expert, told the BBC. In court, Klette claimed her trial was politically motivated and said she remained committed to fighting “capitalism and the patriarchy.” Supporters in the public gallery shouted slogans. Others debated whether the sentence was too harsh, or whether the trial was meant not just to condemn a self-proclaimed leftwing extremist, but an entire leftwing movement.
On the right, Klette’s sentence has been seen as too lenient, even though she also faces trial for alleged involvement in three attacks in 1990 and 1994: a failed bombing outside a bank, a shooting at the US embassy in Bonn, and a 1993 bombing at a prison.
Much criticism has been aimed at the courts for not being able to try Klette for membership in the RAF because the alleged crimes happened too long ago, and at authorities for somehow allowing her to live apparently undisturbed in a bohemian neighborhood in Berlin for 30 years. The fact that German laws prevent police from using the facial recognition technology that a journalist used to eventually identify Klette has caused disbelief.
These concerns echo issues raised in the 1970s, a decade as polarized as our own. They are understandable, but they now miss the point. Klette’s conviction marks the end of the German state’s successful battle with the RAF. It may have taken more than half a century, but it’s worth examining because it offers important lessons in how the fight against terrorist networks can and should be handled.
View image in fullscreen: The West German embassy in Stockholm after members of the Red Army Faction terrorist organization seized the building and detonated two bombs, 28 April 1975. Photograph: Keystone/Getty Images
One reason the RAF was eventually defeated was that senior officials finally realized that giving in to its blackmail would only encourage more terrorist attacks. A new specialist police unit was trained and equipped to resolve hostage situations.Hostage-taking and hijackings raised the stakes for potential attackers and gave decision-makers a crucial tactical option. Another factor was that, despite some instances of unconstitutional and illegal repression, the state’s response largely stayed within the law, and successive governments ensured that terrorist offenses were handled through the criminal justice system.
The legacy of this approach is still clear today. Prosecutors have carefully and sensibly separated Klette’s alleged crimes from any political context. This is a stark contrast to the treatment of Palestine Action in the UK, where the unjustified and politicized use of terrorism laws is completely counterproductive.
The RAF was mainly defeated by widespread public disgust at its violence. Disillusionment spread quickly and broadly, even among supporters. A 1971 poll found that about a fifth of West Germans saw the group’s actions as political rather than criminal. A year later, Meinhof was betrayed while hiding in an apartment she thought was safe. Defections and internal conflicts grew as the RAF turned on itself.
By the 1980s, the group had become outdated. Its roots were in the mass protest movement of the late 1960s. Members had decided that marches and votes weren’t enough to achieve the radical revolutionary change they wanted, so they turned to violence. But they were wrong. Their bombs and bullets did nothing to advance progressive causes.
As in other parts of Western Europe, many of the demands raised by protesters were eventually partly met. Abortion and divorce laws were reformed or passed, voting ages were lowered, funds were directed to further education, rigid hierarchies were questioned for the first time, and young celebrities in music, sport, and even politics gained new prominence.
Together, these factors meant that long before Klette became involved in radical activism, activists were looking to create change within the democratic system, not to destroy it. They believed this was the way to achieve nuclear disarmament, protect the environment, or pursue the more specific interests of particular communities. Those who still chased “revolution” attracted satire—think Rick from The Young Ones (1982-84)—not a mass following.
In short, democracy worked. It defused violence, addressed grievances, and channeled activism into more productive, less divisive, and less harmful forms. The robberies for which Klette will go to prison had nothing to do with the struggle for social justice or the fight against imperialism or capitalism.
Böll’s portrayal of six against 60 million was exaggerated, but still insightful. The RAF were just a handful of individuals, the most extreme part of a radical fringe. Their actions did great harm to progressive causes in West Germany and around the world. Far from romanticizing their supposed armed struggle, Böll was exposing its fundamental failure.
Jason Burke is the author of The Revolutionists: The Story of the Extremists who Hijacked the 1970s and the Guardian’s international security correspondent.
Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.
Frequently Asked Questions
Here is a list of FAQs about how Germany dismantled the Red Army Faction written in a natural tone with clear concise answers
BeginnerLevel Questions
1 What exactly was the Red Army Faction
The RAF was a farleft militant group active in West Germany from the 1970s to the 1990s They carried out bombings kidnappings and assassinations targeting politicians business leaders and US military personnel aiming to overthrow what they saw as a fascist state
2 How did Germany finally stop the RAF
Germany stopped the RAF through a combination of intense police work new laws and a longterm strategy Key tactics included massive manhunts wiretapping using undercover agents and isolating captured members in highsecurity prisons to break their communication networks
3 Was it just a military or police victory
No it was a strategic victory not just a military one While police raids and arrests were crucial the real success came from cutting off the groups support network preventing new recruits and making it impossible for them to operate freely
4 Did the German government change any laws because of the RAF
Yes Germany passed several controversial laws including allowing contact bans and increasing surveillance powers These laws were heavily debated but were seen as necessary to dismantle the group
5 What was the German Autumn of 1977
The German Autumn was the peak of the RAFs violence In a few months they kidnapped and murdered industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer hijacked a Lufthansa plane and their leaders committed suicide in prison It was a national crisis that forced the government to take a hard line
IntermediateLevel Questions
6 How did Germany cut off the RAFs support network
They targeted the second tier of supporterspeople who provided safe houses false documents and money but didnt pull the trigger Through surveillance and witness protection they flipped informants and arrested logistics providers starving the active terrorists of resources
7 Did the highsecurity prisons actually work
Yes in a specific way The RAF members were isolated in special wings with no contact with each other or the outside world This prevented them from coordinating attacks from prison
